The Constructive Nature of Empiric Cognition in Science

Abstract

Aim. To substantiate the constructive nature of empirical knowledge in science as an alternative to its understanding as a “reflection” of objective reality.

Methodology. It is shown on the material of the history of science that the scientific interpretation of empirical knowledge a “reflection” of reality contradicts the real history of science. All the structural elements of the empirical level of scientific knowledge (protocol proposals, empirical facts, empirical laws and empirical (phenomenological) theories) are the results of not just active, but also constructive thinking activity aiming at creating an abstract reality and describing it. The main constructive means of thinking for the creation of empirical reality are described. Results. The relative independence of empirical knowledge in relation to both the sensory level of scientific knowledge (observation and experimental data) and in relation to scientific theories is substantiated.

Research implications. Recognition of the constructive nature of empirical cognition requires considering when creating empirical knowledge in science not only experimental data and thinking, but also the will of the scientist as a necessary factor of making a cognitive decision in conditions of ever-present freedom of choice. One of the essential limitations of such freedom is the collective nature of scientific knowledge and the need for the scientific community to develop a certain scientific consensus acceptable to most of its members.